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employee's permanent or temporary residence; (2) the place where the
employee takes his meals; and (3) the place where the employee ordinarily receives his salary.
The various American workmen's compensation systems are most
similar to the Italian system, with accidents occurring outside the place
of employment being compensated only if the employer provides the
means of transportation or if the trip is otherwise affected by the specific dangers of the employment. This book shows that there is room
for improvement.

LAW IN INDIA
By K. Subba Rao. Bombay: University of Bombay, 1970. Pp. vi, 318.
THE POSITION OF THE JUDICIARY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. By
H. M. Seervai. Bombay: University of Bombay, 1970. Pp. ix, 164.
LAND AND THE CONSTITUTION IN INDIA. By H. C. L. Merillat. New York
and London: Columbia University Press, 1970. Pp. xvi, 321.
SOME CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS.

Reviewed by Ralph F. Fuchs*
The two volumes by Indian authors consist of recent lectures in
the Chimanlal Setalvad series at the University of Bombay. They possess unusual importance for two reasons. One is the extraordinary
current significance of some of the issues of Indian constitutional law
and judicial administration that are discussed; the other lies in the
role which each author has played in relation to these matters and the
weight which consequently attaches to his views. K. Subba Rao was
Chief Justice of India at the time of the famous Golak Nath decision
holding, contrary to a prior decision, that the Fundamental Rights
bestowed by the Indian Constitution can no longer be curtailed by
amendment.' He wrote the plurality opinion of the Court in that case
after having led recurring majorities of his colleagues in earlier adjudications on constitutional protections to property, which culminated in Golak Nath. H. M. Seervai is Advocate-General of the State
of Maharashtra and the author of a 1967 treatise on Indian constitutional law 2 that has attracted much attention. Here he appears as a
forthright critic of the work of the Court. The former Chief Justice
* Professor Emeritus of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington.
1. Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1643. See Fuchs, Book
Review, Law in India, 17 Am. J. Comp. L. 144 (1969). By means of an expansion of American "prospective overruling" the Court avoided the application
of its new holding to amendments adopted prior to the decision, which remain
in effect. Under the terms of an amendment so adopted the Court upheld the
state land reform law, reallocating property rights among individuals, which
was before it.
2. H. M. Seervai, Constitutional Law in India: A Critical Commentary

(1967).
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writes of the reasons for Golak Nath in a manner which adds materially to his opinion as chief spokesman of the Court.
Mr. Seervai is in essence a realist who sees the basis of judicial
authority in constitutional as well as other adjudications as dependent
on specific bestowal, including that in constitutional texts and prior
interpretative decisions. In English law, which lacks a written constitution, judicial authority rests on precedents and statutes. There is
no "rule of law" rising higher than these sources.3 Nor is there an
antithesis between law and a legally bestowed judicial or administrative discretion, each of which operates within defined limits. 4 To
Chief Justice Subba Rao, on the other hand, "[t] he Supreme Court has
no higher duty under the Constitution than to protect the people's
freedom" and, as "[t] he first essential" to this end, provide enforcement of the rule of law,"' including enforcement of the Fundamental
Rights against purported constitutional amendments that would curtail them. 6
The elaborate process of reasoning from constitutional texts, set
forth in the Golak Nath opinions to support the decision, 7 is repeated
in Chief Justice Subba Rao's lectures and demolished by Mr. Seervai;
but it becomes essentially irrelevant if the decision was actually rooted
in a higher law or was, as the Chief Justice also asserts,8 "A sincere attempt . . . to save for the future, the remaining fundamental rights
from the process of destruction by Parliamentary Amendment,"
which assertedly had taken place. The recital here leaves little doubt
that this purpose was the reason for the decision. The final arbiter
of constitutional change affecting the Fundamental Rights becomes,
then, the judgment of the Court, unless another constituent assembly
should be summoned. As many critics have emphasized, a democracy
cannot accept such judicial constriction of popular processes. Hence
the issue generated by the Golak Nath decision will remain central to
Indian politics until it is resolved by some reenactment of the amending process, an unlikely repudiation of the decision by the Court, or
future judicial interpretation of the existing Fundamental Rights with
sufficient flexibility to avoid the need for their amendment.
Chief Justice Subba Rao supplies, to be sure, an impressive recital
of the lengths to which the ruling Congress Party of India had gone
over the years in employing the relatively easy amending process in
Parliament," not only to overcome decisions which had invalidated
3. Seervai, The Positionof the Judiciary 91-96.
4. Ibid., 89-91.
5. Subba Rao, Some ConstitutionalProblems 61.
6. Ibid., 88-95. Such amendments are held by the majority in Golak Nath
to be "laws" which are expressly made void by Article 13(2) because of their
contravention of the Rights.
7. In addition to the principal point stated in the preceding footnote, the
source in the Constitution of the amending power and the basis for preserving
the effectiveness of amendments previously adopted were adumbrated by the
Court.
8. Subba Rao, supra note 5 at 80.
9. Article 368, which prescribes the amending process, provides that for

the great bulk of constitutional provisions, amendments may be adopted by a
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prior legislation, but also to forestall future decisions by adopting
amendments to insulate enumerated statutes from judicial review.
Such trigger-happiness with relation to real or anticipated threats from
the judiciary, in preference to further litigation to produce change, is
indeed repugnant and was not necessary or even fully effective to
save essential economic and social reforms. Mr. Seervai makes no defense of it or of the merits of the measures which the Congress Party
was attempting; but he attacks the extremism and artificiality of the
ultimate judicial response.
Both writers deal with a large range of other matters as wellnotably the burden on the Supreme Court and state High Courts because of their extensive original and appellate jurisdiction, the lessthan-adequate status of the judiciary in the governmental structure,
the unyieldingly low level of judicial salaries, the existing counterproductive set of provisions for the retirement of the judges, and
handicaps besetting the bar. The former Chief Justice supplies, in addition, an illuminating account of the decision-making processes of the
Supreme Court which, according to him, involve oral conferences only
in a "very few" important cases. Oral argument before the Court,
with its unlimited duration and continuous exchange of views among
the judges and counsel, are considered to provide the necessary
groundwork for subsequent consideration and interchanges on the part
of the judges. Mr. Seervai believes the judges should be more restrained in their questioning of counsel.
Despite poor organization and numerous typographical flaws in
Chief Justice Subba Rao's book, one emerges from a reading of both
volumes with a renewed sense of respect for the performance of the
Indian judiciary at its top levels in disposing, with whatever difficulty,
of a task of extreme magnitude. The failure of Indian political leadership to grasp the needs of this branch of the government and lend
it every facility, which both these writers deplore, remains highly regrettable. Both authors, it should be noted, exemplify the learning
which characterizes many leading Indian jurists by widespread reference to English and American authors,, decisions, and jurisprudential
experience. Although the discussion of American experience is not
altogether free of minor flaws, it draws shrewdly, in the main, on the
lessons of that experience.
Professor Merillat's book brings the resources and skills of a penetrating scholarship, including research into economic and political
reality, to bear on the principal complex of problems with which the
other two volumes also deal. The result, aided by the author's extensive experience in India itself, is a richly informative history and appraisal. It prepares for the discussion of constitutional developments
by an account of the pre-independence agricultural land-tenure systems in India, that called for reform; the nature of the reforms proposed; the extent to which resistance at the state legislative level
majority of the membership of each house, constituting not less than two-thirds
of those present and voting, followed by the assent of the President.
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adapted these reforms to middle-class rather than dispossessed-class
purposes; and the importance today of urban development programs
in accomplishing social improvement that gives rise to constitutional
issues. The property and related clauses of the Fundamental Rights
provisions of the Constitution, together with their judicial interpretation, have resulted on the whole in much greater legislative freedom
for the state to curtail and acquire property rights with less than full
compensation to the owners than prevails, for example, in the United
States. Nevertheless crucial judicial decisions have from time to time
imposed uncertainties and hazards on reform measures, sometimes
with only tenuous reasoning based on constitutional texts. The response through constitutional amendments has been excessive; but
the stricture imposed by the Golak Nath decision, whether or not its
doctrinal framework can be defended, has no support in the actual intentions of the Constituent Assembly with respect to the amending
process.
Professor Merillat's account extends beyond Golak Nath to the
Supreme Court's decision in February, 1970, invalidating the first
bank nationalization measure of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's government. 10 In intervening cases prior to that decision, the Court had
given evidence of a relaxed interpretation of the Fundamental
Rights;" but in that case the tribunal, possibly goaded by the aggressive political stance reflected in the measure, held 10-1, after 34
days of argument, that the law was invalid because it provided only
"illusory" compensation for property taken and denied equal protection of the laws. The battle lines between the Court and political
forces bent on radical change, at least as against unpopular economic
interests, were thus drawn anew. In December, 1970, the Court struck
down the President's measure to terminate the privy purses and tax
exemptions of the Rulers of former principalities or their successors,
which were accorded in the Constitution after these Rulers agreed to
the entry of their principalities into the Union. 1 2 The Prime Minister's
smashing victory in the 1971 elections obviously strengthens the Government's hand vis-A-vis the Court; but the nature of any ultimate ac10. R. C. Cooper v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 564. Professor Merillat
deals with this case in a Postscript to his book; Mr. Seervai criticizes the decision in the Preface to his volume, showing that it was made to rest in part on
the conception of a transcendent "rule of law" such as Chief Justice Subba Rao
sets forth in his book here under review. The former Chief Justice was no
longer a member of the Court, having resigned, as Professor Merillat notes
(p. 272), to become a candidate for the Presidency.
11. Merillat, 272-286.

12. Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 530, discussed
at length on p. 79 of this issue by N. Roberts. The decision in the majority
opinion was based, not on the now uncurtailable Fundamental Rights provisions of the Constitution, but on other provisions specifically applicable to the
claims of the Rulers. If these should now be curtailed or deleted by constitutional amendment, questions could be raised of whether property rights secured by Fundamental Rights provisions had been invalidly abrogated. In the

eyes of two of the Justices, they had been violated by the Presidential action
under attack.
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commodation is not made clearer by this political event. One hopes
that, despite the sharpness of political rhetoric, the value of the judicial process in contributing to the reasoned development of basic
national policy will not be lost.
Given the vital importance of success of the Indian experiment to
the survival of democracy east of Europe, American concern with
events in that country should remain continuously high. It is fortunate
that, in the legal sphere, an observer of the calibre and knowledgeability of Professor Merillat is at work, reporting his findings.

SOVIET LAW
GRAZHDANSTVO V SOVETSKOM

SOYUZNOM GOSUDARSTVE

THE SOVIET FEDERAL STATE).

By V. S. Shevtsov.
dicheskaya literatura, 1969. Pp. 166.

(CITIZENSHIP
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Reviewed by George Ginsburgs*
Monographs on Soviet citizenship law by local authors are a rarity,
so the appearance of the present study is somewhat of an event. Back
in 1965, Mr. Shevtsov had already published a brochure on the subject,
which ran to 64 pages, and his latest treatise has now been expanded to
almost three times the size.
The survey contains little that is startling. As is unfortunately all
too common in Soviet legal literature, the author spends a disproportionate amount of time on polemics over definitional terms, as though
by virtue of semantic gymnastics and casuistic disputation a higher
substantive truth will suddenly be revealed and the scattered fragments of the universe neatly fall into place. The lengths to which Soviet writers can go in arguing over syntactic abstractions never ceases
to be a source of wonder and frustration to one weaned on the empirical tradition who must plough through vast tracts of verbiage representing the legal equivalent of the medieval brainteaser about how
many angels would fit on the head of a pin.
Few new facts emerge from the analysis. One useful bit of
fresh intelligence is a positive statement to the effect that in practice
a presumption operates that foundlings in the USSR come of Soviet
parents and thus the law recognizes them as Soviet citizens which
helps dispel a minor mystery engendered by statutory silence on that
score. Some welcome light is also shed on the administrative routine
of processing applications for admission to Soviet citizenship. The
preparatory work is handled by the legal department of the Presidium
of the USSR Supreme Soviet which makes the necessary inquiries and
puts the data in proper form; as a rule, the Consular bureau of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs furnishes its opinion on the issue of an
*

Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research.

